When the exception is the rule : rationalising the 'medical exception' in Scots law by Brown, Jonathan
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the Exception is the Rule: Rationalising the 
‘Medical Exception’ in Scots Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No medical practitioner who performs a legitimate medical operation on a patient (in 
the course of competently carrying out the duties of their profession)1 commits a delict or a 
criminal offence.2 This is so in spite of the fact that to infringe the bodily integrity of another 
person is plainly both a crime3 and a civil wrong.4 Notwithstanding the fact that the patient 
may desire the operation, the ‘defence’ of consent cannot possibly justify the serious injuries 
intentionally inflicted in the course of an operation to effect a kidney transplant, or to amputate 
a limb, or even to insert a stent, since these procedures are highly invasive and effect 
irreversible changes to the physicality of the patient(s).5 The ‘medical exception’ has 
consequently and consistently been invoked   by legal commentators when considering cases 
of invasive surgery, or procedures which involve serious wounding.6   
Since consent is no defence to serious assault,7 this exception to the general rule that to 
inflict such is to commit a crime must be justified by means other than an appeal to the 
                                                          
1 ‘Proper’ medical treatment is a prerequisite: Margaret Brazier and Sara Fovargue, Transforming Wrong into 
Right: What is ‘Proper Medical Treatment’?, in Sara Fovargue and Alexandra Mullock, The Legitimacy of 
Medical Treatment: What Role for the Medical Exception, (London: Routledge, 2016), p.12 
2 See, generally, Sara Fovargue and Alexandra Mullock, The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the 
Medical Exception, (London: Routledge, 2016), passim. 
3 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2017) 
para.33.46 
4 See Joe Thomson, Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007) para.11.09. When speaking generally, the phrase ‘civil 
wrong’ will be preferred throughout this article. When speaking of Scots law specifically, the term ‘delict’ shall 
be used and the term ‘tort’ shall be employed when specific consideration is given to Common law jurisprudence. 
5 Indeed, ‘drugging’ well-known and nominate example of the crime of ‘real injury’ in Scots law (see Grant v 
HM Advocate 1938 J.C. 7) and so, but for the medical exception, even the anaesthetist who prepared the patient 
for surgery would be guilty of a specific crime but for the medical exception. 
6 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, p.356 
7 In criminal law; the defence of volenti non fit injuria would be available to a defender in any delictual case. A 
distinction in respect of the criminal law must here be drawn between Scots law and English law; in English law, 
it has been argued that consent is sufficient to negate ‘trespassory touching’, which might otherwise be a minor 
assault (or battery). In Scots law, however, there exists case law (Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.33) which 
suggests that consent is no defence to even minor assaults and the very notion of ‘trespassory touching’ is alien 
to that legal system: See Niall Whitty and Murray Earle, Medical Law, (Reissue) in The Laws of Scotland: Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia, para.242 
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willingness of the patient.8 Quite where this justification lies, however, remains controversial 
and under-theorised. As a legitimate surgical operation may be elective or wholly cosmetic, 
such treatment cannot be legally justified on grounds of ‘necessity’.9 In 1967, Gordon’s 
Criminal Law consequently concluded that the medical exception was sui generis.10 This 
assessment has not much changed in the decades between the publication of this volume and 
the text’s fourth edition.11 The editors of the latest edition of Gordon’s work provide no 
rationale for the existence of the medical exception, simply noting it is ‘probably’12 justified 
‘because the injuries are inflicted in such cases not for their own sake or in order to cause pain 
or gratify an intention to harm, but for the benefit of the patient’.13 In considering the legal 
position within the Common law tradition, although Stephen could find no authority for the 
existence of the ‘medical exception’,14 he nevertheless held that ‘the existence of surgery as a 
profession assumes the truth of the exception’.15  
There is no need, however, to rely on probability assessments or axioms in justifying 
the presence of the medical exception in Scots law, or indeed, as is later submitted, in the 
Common law world. Authority for the exception exists and has long existed, but the 
underpinnings of the exception have been thought so trite – and of such little practical 
consequence16 – to those involved in recording the principles of law that they generally 
remained unarticulated and thus have, in due course, been forgotten. Nevertheless, it is 
                                                          
8 Indeed, it has been observed that ‘although it probably makes very little difference in practice, it should be noted 
that, in principle, consent is not a defence’ to assault: Joe Thomson, Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007) 
para.11.10 
9 See Glanville Williams, Consent and Public Policy [1962] Crim. L. R. 154, p.156 
10 Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1967), p.774 
11 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) Vol. II (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2017) para.33.39 
12 Present author’s emphasis.  
13 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) Vol. II (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2017) para.33.39 
14 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, p.356 
15 J. F. Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, (St. Louis: 1878), pp.145-146 
16 See the discussion in Joe Thomson, Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007) para.11.10 
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submitted that a study of the underpinnings of this rule is scholastically justified as such 
provides a rationalisation of the place and taxonomy of the contemporary crime and delict of 
‘assault’ in Scots law. In 2012, Lewis provided an account of the history of the medical 
exception.17 Her work did not, however, deign to discuss the Scottish position in any detail. 
This article, consequently, provides consideration of this topic. 
Herein, it is submitted that the basis of the medical exception in Scots law lies in the 
etymology of the term ‘injury’ and the connection between this word in its specific legal sense 
and the concept of iniuria in Roman law and ius commune jurisprudence. The significance of 
this can be traced by considering the history of iniuria as a crime/delict18 in early modern Scots 
law and considering the effect of the divergence of criminal wrongs and delictual wrongs which 
occurred in the nineteenth century.19 At its core, the actio iniuriarum – the action to afford 
redress to one who has suffered injury, in the sense of ‘insult’ or ‘affront’ – serves to protect 
the dignity and social standing of individual legal persons.20 More than this, however, the 
crime/delict also served to preserve and uphold boni mores – good morals.21 Any conduct 
which intentionally and contumeliously affronted the dignity of a legal person could be 
classified contra bonos mores, and so amount to iniuria,22 but it is apparent that iniuria may 
be effected even in instances in which there could be no subjective affront to the individual 
person.23 This, it is submitted, provides a rationalisation for, and justifies the existence of, the 
                                                          
17 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355 
18 See John Blackie and James Chalmers, Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime, in Matthew Dyson, 
Comparing Tort and Crime: Learning from across and within Legal Systems, (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), p.286 
19 See John Blackie, The Interaction of Crime and Delict in Scotland, in Matthew Dyson (Ed.), Unravelling Tort 
and Crime, (Cambridge: CUP, 2014) 
20 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), p.1062 
21 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.183; Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Actio Iniuriarum, in The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.1058 
22 See, e.g., Delange v Costa 1989 (2) SA 857 (A) 
23 As in the case of self- or voluntary castration, which was punishable regardless of the consent of the ‘victim’: 
See Damhauder, Practiicke in Civile en Crimineele Saeken, cap. 81 
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medical exception in Scots law; ‘proper medical treatment’ is not contra bonos mores and so 
cannot be said to amount to injury or assault. Hence, the framing of the ‘medical exception’ as 
an exception is wrongheaded; it is, rather, the consequence of the conceptual understanding of 
‘assault’ and ‘real injury’ in that jurisdiction. 
II. The Taxonomy of ‘Assault’ 
A. ‘Trespass’ and ‘Injury’  
In English law, the torts of assault and battery are causes of action under the umbrella 
of the form of action known as ‘trespass to the person’.24 Actions in respect of trespass are 
among the oldest forms of action known to the Common law.25 In addition to persons, trespass 
may be committed against patrimonial assets – whether ‘real’ (i.e., heritable)26 or ‘personal’ 
(i.e., moveable).27 Historically, trespass was a penal action for any transgression which fell 
short of amounting to a felony.28 The nature of the wrong in a case of trespass was the ‘breach 
of the King’s peace’ effected by laying hands on the plaintiff, or by taking his goods, or by 
                                                          
24 Rachael Mulheron, Principles of Tort Law, (Cambridge: CUP, 2016), p.689; Mulheron stresses that ‘trespass 
to the person is a form of action’, while torts such as assault and battery are causes of action. For the significance 
and history of the forms and causes of action, see John Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 5th Edn. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2019), Ch.4 (passim).  
25 F. W. Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures, (Cambridge: CUP, 
1910), p.342 
26 Lord Hailsham, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.97 (5th Ed.) (London: LexisNexis, 2015), para.536; Michael 
A. Jones, Anthony M Dugdale and Mark Simpson, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (22nd Edn.) (Sweet and Maxwell, 
2017), para.19-01 
27 Lord Hailsham, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol.97 (5th Ed.) (London: LexisNexis, 2015), para.602; Michael 
A. Jones, Anthony M Dugdale and Mark Simpson, Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (22nd Edn.) (Sweet and Maxwell, 
2017), para.17-130 
28 F. W. Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures, (Cambridge: CUP, 
1910), p.343. As Baker notes, the word in its original sense was not a term of art and so it was broad enough to 
encompass felonies as well as misdemeanours – See John Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, 5th Edn. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2019), p.67 (See also S. F. C. Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III, [1958] LQR 195, 
p.195 and Peter Birks, The Early History of Iniuria, [1969] The Legal History Review 163, p.163) – but as 
Maitland notes, as in English law ‘throughout the Middle-Ages there is no such word as misdemeanour… the 
crimes which do not amount to felony are trespasses’. 
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invading his land.29 Originally, such would require at least some degree of violence,30 but such 
was the utility of the action for trespass that, over time, the fiction that mere trespassory 
touching amounted to a sufficient breach of this peace emerged.31 To this day, even the most 
limited forms of touching – in the absence of consent – might be grounds for an action of 
battery.32 
The wrong known as ‘assault’ in Scots law has little, other than its name, in common 
with this English tort.33 The term itself was not a feature of Scots language or law until after 
the union which created the state of Great Britain in 1707,34 but – likely as a result of the union35 
– the term began to enter both the common and legal vernacular during the course of the 18th 
century.36 Though the word did eventually make its way into Scottish legal discourse, the 
underlying taxonomy of trespass was not adopted by Scots law.37 Just as the phrase ‘trespass 
to a chattel’ would be ‘perfectly unmeaning’ in Scots law,38 so too is the concept of ‘trespass 
                                                          
29 Ken Oliphant and Donal Nolan, Tort Law: Texts and Materials, (6th Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2017) p.4 
30 F. W. Maitland, Equity and the Forms of Action at Common Law: Two Courses of Lectures, (Cambridge: CUP, 
1910), p.344 
31 See Cole v Turner (1704) 6 Mod Rep 149; the notion of ‘breach of the King’s peace’ was itself described as a 
fiction by Deiser (see George F. Deiser, The Development of Principle in Trespass, [1917] Yale Law Journal 220, 
p.221), but this can itself be understood as a product of the superimposition of one’s contemporary mores over an 
incomparable schema: See John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights 
of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.56 
32 F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990] 2 AC 1 (HL), p.73 (per Lord Goff).  
33 See Cassie Watson, Doom for Demembring: Assault in Scots Law, [2017] Legal History Miscellany; John 
Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Modern and Early Modern Scots Law, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen 
Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.158. Conduct which may be 
described as ‘assault’ in one jurisdiction would not necessarily be conceived of as such in the other.   
34 Until the late 17th century, the term ‘assault’ was only ever used by Scots in the sense of a military assault on a 
building; by the turn of that century, however, it found use in law, though only in a descriptive sense, in cases of 
real injury: John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality 
in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), pp.52-54 
35 See Cassie Watson, Doom for Demembring: Assault in Scots Law, [2017] Legal History Miscellany, fn.20 
36 Although it did not emerge as a nominate crime and delict until the 19th century: See John Blackie, Unity in 
Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.104 
37 John Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Modern and Early Modern Scots Law, in Eric Descheemaeker and 
Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.158 
38 Leitch & Co v Leydon 1931 SC (HL) 1 at 8 
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to the person’ utterly unknown to the courts north of the Tweed.39 The roots of the Scottish 
conception of ‘assault’ are to be found in the taxonomy of the crime/delict iniuria – injury – 
rather than in any notion of ‘trespass’.40   
Iniuria was one of the four institutional delicts known to Roman law.41 The term 
ordinarily appears twice in any list of the Roman delicts, which is taken to include furtum 
(theft), rapina (theft with violence), damnum iniuria datum (proprietary loss caused by 
wrongful conduct) and iniuria.42 The fact that the term appears twice provides some small 
insight into its etymological complexity; in addition to its significance in the establishment of 
Aquilian liability, Justinian ascribed three other distinct meanings to the term. He held that, in 
general, the word might be used to denote any act done without legal justification;43 secondly 
that it may mean the specific wrong done by a judge who imposes an unjust sentence;44 thirdly, 
and finally, it may be used to refer to the specific delict which occurs when a subject causes 
compensable affront to another.45 The last of these represents the specific delict ‘iniuria’; a 
contumelious attack on the dignity of a freeman, which may give rise to an actio iniuriarum.46  
                                                          
39 Niall R. Whitty, Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body in Scots Law, (2005) Edin. L. R. 
9 (2), 194, p.215 
40 Some Scots writers have, however, made use of the language of ‘trespass’, in a strictly non-technical sense, 
when discussing the crime/delict of ‘injury’ (Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland, 
(Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.175) or ‘personal violence’ (John Guthrie Smith, A Treatise on the Law of 
Reparation, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1864), p.41. An interesting contrast can consequently be drawn with the 
work of Blackstone, wherein the jurist utilises the language of ‘injury’ (albeit in a similarly non-technical sense) 
to describe the nominate English wrong of ‘trespass’: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England 
in Four Books, vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), Ch.8;  Ch.12 
41 H. F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law, (Cambridge: CUP, 1952), p.170 
42 See W. W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, (2nd Ed.) (Cambridge: CUP, 1939), p.318 
43 ‘Iniuria dicitur omne quod non iure fit’: Justinian, Institutes, 4.4   
44 Justinian, Institutes, 4.4  
45 See Justinian, Institutes, 4.4; Dig. 47.10; C. 9.35. See also M. Kaster, Das Romische Privatrecht, I (Munich: 
Beck, 1955) pp.21-22; 139-140; 520-522  
46 A. M. Prichard, Leages’ Roman Law, (3rd Ed.) (London: MacMillan and Co, 1961), p.417; Dig. 47.10.2  
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The actio iniuriarum serves as an action to protect the non-patrimonial interests of a 
legal person; i.e., it protects ‘who a person is rather than what a person has’.47 This Romanistic 
understanding of iniuria – or ‘injury’ – as a specific form of wrongdoing was adopted by the 
then-Lord Advocate Sir George MacKenzie in his textbook on Matters Criminal.48  Therein, 
he posited that ‘injury, in its more comprehensive sense, may give a name to all crimes; for all 
crimes are injuries, but injury as it is the Subject of this Title, is the same thing with contumely 
or reproach’.49 Injuries, in this sense, were divided into two sub-categories – iniuria verbalis 
(verbal injuries, those injuries inflicted by words) and iniuria realis (‘real’ injuries inflicted by 
means other than words).50  
At the time of MacKenzie’s writing, there were no tertiary sub-categories of iniuria 
verbalis51 (though the later delict of defamation has its origin as a sub-category of iniuria 
also),52 however as Professor Blackie demonstrated, there were, by 1700, a complex array of 
sub-categories of iniuria realis which served to protect individual interests in bodily integrity, 
physical liberty, sexual morality, family life, privacy and dignity.53 Such included (but were 
                                                          
47 Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
(Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.3 
48 Sir George MacKenzie, The Laws and Customes of Scotland, In Matters Criminal. Wherein is to be seen how 
the Civil Law, and the Laws and Customs of other Nations do agree with, and supply ours, (Edinburgh: James 
Glenn, 1678). Though the text is, as the title suggests, concerned with criminal law, at the time of MacKenzie’s 
writing there was no substantial difference between the law of delict and the criminal law: See John Blackie and 
James Chalmers, Mixing and Matching in Scottish Delict and Crime, in Matthew Dyson, Comparing Tort and 
Crime: Learning from across and within Legal Systems, (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), p.286 
49 MacKenzie, Matters Criminal, Tit. XXX, I (p.304); this is closely paraphrased by Forbes in his Institutes: See 
William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), p.130 
50 MacKenzie, Matters Criminal, Tit. XXX, I (p.304) 
51 John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), pp.93-94 
52 See John Blackie, Defamation, in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann, A History of Private Law in 
Scotland, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp.633-634 
53 John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.38 
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not limited to) bodily ‘invasion’,54 hamesucken,55 mutilation,56 abduction,57 false 
imprisonment,58 adultery,59 interference with dead bodies60 and general insulting behaviour.61 
These specific sub-categories often received treatment under separate headings in legal texts of 
this time, although they all drew from the same – ultimately Romanistic – roots.62 
                                                          
54 In Bayne’s account, ‘if a blow or wound is given’, such is sufficient ‘by the very nature of the injurious act’ to 
render to injury ‘atrocious’ and so actionable in law: Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of 
Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.181 
55 Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.182; William 
Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), p.130. The 
definition of this crime/delict given by Bayne and Forbes mirrors that given by MacKenzie in his Matters 
Criminal: See the discussion in John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.53 
56 This sub-category – along with another known as ‘demembration’, which concerned the severing of a limb from 
a freeman’s body – was the subject of extensive treatment by Sir Alexander Seton, Lord Pitmedden, in his Treatise 
of Mutilation and Demembration, (Edinburgh: Andrew Andersen, 1699). It is worth noting that Pitmedden 
describes the first part of his treatise as ‘medico-juridical’, given the context of the present discussion: See p.5.  
57 Initially termed raptus or plagium, though in the late 18th century plagium came to refer to the abduction (or, 
indeed, ‘theft’) of children alone (see Jonathan Brown, Plagium: An Archaic and Anomalous Crime [2016] Jur. 
Rev. 129) and, even by Forbes’ time, ‘rape’ or ‘ravishing’ had, come to obtain its meaning of ‘the carnal 
knowledge of a woman or man by force and against the person’s will’:  William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law 
of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), p.125. It is notable, and indeed a point of great 
interest, that Forbes’ definition of this crime/delict conceptualised it as one which might be committed against 
either a man or a woman (indeed, this observation is repeated in his Great Body of the Law of Scotland: Forbes, 
Great Body: Forbes Manuscript page ID: forbes-54-0214). A discussion of the provenance and significance of 
Forbes’ conceptualisation of this crime/delict is outwith the scope of this paper, but would – in light of the 
commonly understood pre-2009 definition of ‘rape’ within Scots law – certainly merit further investigation. 
58 At common law, the specific sub-delict was initially styled crimen privati carceris, however this designation 
declined in importance after, likely under influence of the English term ‘false imprisonment’, the delict came to 
be styled ‘wrongous imprisonment’ (see Oliphant v Wemyss (1661) reported in E. G. Scott-Moncrieff, The 
Records of the Proceedings of the Justiciary Court Edinburgh 1661-1678, Vo. I. (Edinburgh: Scottish History 
Society, 1905), p.5) and in turn, though a common law claim remained possible as an alternative, was ultimately 
superseded by the introduction of the Act Anent Wrongous Imprisonment 1701: John Blackie, The Protection of 
Corpus in Modern and Early Modern Scots Law, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.160 
59 William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), pp.120-
125 
60 William Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), p.131. 
This sub-category receives no nomen iuris, but is presumably based (in Forbes’ conception) on D.47.10.1.4, as – 
in a manner consistent with Ulpian’s observation therein – Forbes provides that ‘it is also reckoned injurious to a 
man, what is done against one whom he represents as heir, or nearest of kin’. See, also, Alexander Bayne, 
Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.188 
61 Some such activity may be de minimis and ‘beneath the notice of the law’: Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the 
Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.180  
62 See the discussion in John Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Modern and Early Modern Scots Law, in Eric 
Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.157; 
see also Grant Barclay, The Structure of Assault in Scots Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective, [2017] 
University of Glasgow LLM(R) Thesis (accessible at http://theses.gla.ac.uk/8569/) 
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The essence of iniuria – the factor common to each of the sub-categories – was the 
contumelious effecting of affront to the existimatio – social standing or ‘civil honour’63 – of 
the victim.64 This contumelious conduct could take potentially any form; as the Institutional 
writer Stair lamented, ‘yea, there be innumerable such acts which the malice and cruelty of men 
can invent’.65 In recognition of this, the general actio iniuriarum developed as an exceptionally 
flexible legal mechanism which proved able to ensure that ‘as long as the wrongdoer’s purpose 
was to bring his victim into disrepute, his conduct – whatever it was – was potentially 
actionable’ as injury.66 Thus, in modern Scots law, it has been suggested that the delict is of 
such wide scope that it can afford remedy to family members in cases of unauthorised post-
mortems67 as well as to victims of image-based sexual abuse.68  
B. Actio Iniuriarum  
The actio iniuriarum was said to serve to protect the corpus (body), fama (reputation) 
and dignitas (dignity) of legal persons.69 As indicated above, however, at a higher level, 
‘iniuria as a delict sanctioning transgressions against someone else’s existimatio could be 
traced back as far as Labeo or even earlier in the late Republic’.70 In the context of most of the 
Roman sources, the word is generally used to refer to the perceived social standing of a human 
                                                          
63 See Abel H. J. Greenidge, Infamia: Its place in Roman Public and Private Law, (Oxford: OUP, 1894), Ch.2 
64 Reinhard Zimmermann, Actio Iniuriarum, in The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), fn.102 
65 James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland Deduced from its Originals and 
Collated with the Civil, Canon and Feudal Laws, and with the Customs of Neighbouring Nations in IV Books, (2nd 
Ed.) (Glasgow: UGP, 1981), IV, 40, 26 
66 In the words of Descheemaeker and Scott: See Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.13 
67 As in Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust 2006 SLT 889 
68 See Jonathan Brown, Revenge Porn and the Actio Iniuriarum: Using ‘Old Law’ to Solve ‘New Problems’, 
[2018] Leg. Stud. 396 
69 Dig. 47.10.1.2; Johannes Voet, Compendium Juris Juxta Seriem Pandectarum, Adjectis Differentiis Juris Civilis 
et Canonici. ut et Defonitionibus ac Divisionibus Praecipuis Secundum Institutionum Titlos, (Lugduni Batavorum: 
Cornelium Boutesteyn and Jodanum Luchtmans, 1707), Book IV Title IV (de injuriis), p.58 
70 Jacob Giltaij, Existimatio as ‘Human Dignity’ in Late-Classical Roman Law, [2016] Fundamina: A Journal of 
Legal History 232, p.236 
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being (whether a free persona or a slave).71 This social standing could be diminished by the 
occurrence of some unanswered iniuria and so it can be inferred that the actio iniuriarum 
served as a response to a contumelious insult and, thus, a means of preserving the existimatio 
of a persona.72  
As Kaser notes, the term existimatio is used only in a descriptive, non-technical sense 
by the Roman jurists.73 This did not, however, prevent the writers of the ius commune from 
ascribing a technical meaning of import to the word.74 In the 16th century, the French jurist 
Donellus drew on the concept of existimatio in developing a theory of subjective ‘personality 
rights’ which sought to see individual interests in life, body, liberty and dignity protected by 
law.75 The concept of ‘dignity’ to which Donellus refers is not, as might be expected, drawn 
from the Ulpianic triad of corpus, fama and dignitas found in D.47.10.1.2; rather, the 
personality right of ‘dignity’ elucidated in Donellus’ work is rooted in the Roman jurist 
Callistratus’ conception of existimatio.76 The actio iniuriarum thus developed, in the 
Continental European legal tradition, as a means of safeguarding ‘dignity’ in the all-
encompassing sense of societal esteem. Such made the action attractive to medieval lawyers 
and legal scholars, who ‘lived within a society that prized good name, dignity and honour 
highly’.77 
                                                          
71 This distinguishes the word from dignitas, as dignitas was only enjoyed by those imbued with legal personality: 
See James Gordley, Reconceptualising the Protection of Dignity in Early Modern Europe: Greek Philosophy 
Meets Roman Law in M Ascheri et al (eds.), Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert, (Böhlau Verlag Köln 
Weimar, 2003), p.286 
72 Matthias Hagemann, Iniuria: von den XII Tafeln bis zur Justinianischen Kodifikation, (Köln: Böhlau, 1998), 
pp.137-138 
73 Max Kaser, Infamia und Ignominia in den Römischen Rechtsquellen, [1956] Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung 
für Rechtsgeschichte: Romanistische Abteilung 220, p.231  
74 Jacob Giltaij, Existimatio as ‘Human Dignity’ in Late-Classical Roman Law, [2016] Fundamina 232, p.237 
75 Donellus, Commentarii de Iure Civili, (1589) 2, 8, 3, pp.229-230 
76 Drawn from D.50.13.5.1 
77 Reinhard Zimmermann, Actio Iniuriarum, in The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.1062 
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The actio iniuriarum was consequentially, at least initially, an action of the utmost 
import in the Roman-Dutch legal tradition.78 The notion (found in Grotius and other Dutch 
writers)79 of iniuria as the occurrence of some deprivation of a natural right evidently 
influenced the Scottish Institutional writers.80 Thus, early modern Scottish jurisprudence 
manifestly received, at this time, both the delict and the remedy of solatium for non-patrimonial 
loss effected by contumelia. Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, Bankton noted that one’s 
interests in ‘fame and reputation’ could be affronted by ‘injury specially so termed’.81 In this 
conceptualisation, ‘injury’ was defined as ‘an offence, maliciously committed, to the reproach 
and grievance of another, whereby his fame, dignity or reputation is hurt’.82 As in MacKenzie’s 
writings, ‘injury’ is divided into ‘real’ and ‘verbal’ injuries; the former is, in Bankton’s work, 
specifically described as ‘an assault’.83   
Historically, the compensation payable on the occurrence of a successful claim for real 
injury was solatium, not damages, as the legal claim did not arise from the occurrence of 
damnum injuria datum.84 Indeed, by dint of the maxim dominus membrorum suorum nemo 
videtur – ‘no one is to be regarded as the owner of their own limbs’ – free legal personae were 
initially barred from claiming for what would now be described as personal injury caused by 
negligence, since the lex Aquilia was, in substance, an action for property damage and a free 
                                                          
78 Though actiones iniuriarum were denigrated by later commentators on the Roman-Dutch law: See Robert 
Warden Lee, Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law, (5th Ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p.335 
79 See, e.g., Hugo Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, (Amsterdam: Joannem Blaev, 1690),  p.294 
80 See Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.1-03 
81 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations on 
the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England, in four books, after the General Method of 
the Viscount of Stair’s Institutions, (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1751), Book I, Tit. X, 29 
82 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations on 
the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England, in four books, after the General Method of 
the Viscount of Stair’s Institutions, (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1751), Book I, Tit. X, 29 
83 Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights: With Observations on 
the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England, in four books, after the General Method of 
the Viscount of Stair’s Institutions, (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1751), Book I, Tit. X, 29 
84 See Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.01 
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person was not, in law, a ‘self-owner’.85 The claim for solatium was not predicated on proof of 
loss or harm, but was penal and awarded in respect of the wounded feelings of the pursuer 
arising from the wrongdoing – the iniuria – that was effected by the defender.86 Such manifestly 
expresses the link between the Romanistic actio iniuriarum and the Scots law of delict and 
crime.87  
By the late nineteenth century, however, Scots law had come to recognise the 
competence of claims (misleadingly referred to as ‘actiones injuriarum’)88 for both patrimonial 
loss and solatium arising from ‘personal injury’ in the modern sense of the term.89 Such ‘injury’ 
could be negligently caused; the salient element of the action was culpa (fault) rather than 
contumelia (affront).90 Thus, in spite of the misleading nomenclature, and in spite of the fact 
that solatium could be concurrently claimed alongside damages under such an action,91 its legal 
ancestor was the lex Aquilia rather than the actio iniuriarum.92 Such, naturally, was said to be 
so liable to utterly confuse students of the Scots law of delict to the extent that ‘either mental 
confusion, or contempt for the system, or both’ was likely to be inculcated in their minds – 
hence the sub-title of T. B. Smith’s 1972 article in the Scots Law Times; Damn, Injuria, 
Damn.93 
                                                          
85 See Lord Stewart’s dicta in Holdich v Lothian Health Board [2013] CSOH 197, para.39; see also Kenneth Reid, 
Body Parts and Property, in Andrew Simpson, Roderick Paisley, Douglas Bain and Nikola Tait (Eds.), Northern 
Lights: Essays in Private Law in Honour of David Carey Miller, (Aberdeen: AUP, 2018), p.248 
86 See R. M. White and M. J. Fletcher, Delictual Damages, (Edinburgh: Butterworth, 2000), p.38; Niall R. Whitty, 
Overview of Rights of Personality in Scots Law, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of 
Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.217 
87 John Blackie, The Protection of Corpus in Modern and Early Modern Scots Law, in Eric Descheemaeker and 
Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), pp.158-159 
88 See the discussion in T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1962), 
p.721 
89 T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1962), pp.719-722 
90 T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1962), pp.719-722 
91 T. B. Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1962), p.720 
92 T. B. Smith, Designation of Delictual Actions: Damn, Injuria, Damn, 1972 SLT (News) 125, p.125 
93 T. B. Smith, Designation of Delictual Actions: Damn, Injuria, Damn, 1972 SLT (News) 125, p.125 
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The emergence of this species of ‘actio injuriarum’, used in the sense of concurrent 
claims of patrimonial loss and solatium, can be traced to the case of Eisten v North British 
Railway Co,94 wherein Lord President Inglis erroneously95 described such a claim as ‘a well-
known class of actions in the civil law’ and ‘an action of damages to repair bodily injuries’.96 
Lord President Inglis’ error went juridically uncorrected (though not completely 
unchallenged)97 for over a century,98 until Lord Kilbrandon, in the case of McKendrick v 
Sinclair,99 expressly and forcefully affirmed that the actio injuriarum was ‘truly based on insult 
or affront’ rather than loss.100 The clarification of this doctrinal muddle did not lead to a 
‘modern renaissance’ of the actio iniuriarum proper, as some Scottish legal scholars hoped,101 
but at the very least it affirmed that the Romanistic actio iniuriarum was known to Scots law 
and that it was to be brought to bear only in cases in which a contumelious mind-state could be 
demonstrated on the part of the defender.102 
The modern understanding of the Scottish actio iniuriarum is more appropriately 
Roman, although actions based upon the claim have rarely called before the courts in recent 
decades.103 In 2006, however, the Court of Session – in the case of Stevens v Yorkhill NHS 
                                                          
94 (1870) 8 M. 980 
95 See T. B. Smith, Damn, Injuria, Again, 1984 SLT (News) 85, p.85 
96 Eisten v North British Railway Co. (1870) 8 M. 980, p.984 
97 See the comments of Lord Macmillan in Stewart's Executrix v London Midland & Scottish Railway Co. 1944 
SLT 13, p.21; see also the comments of Lord Kinnear in McEnaney (Leigh's Executrix) v Caledonian Railway Co 
1913 S.C. 838, wherein it was noted that the Scottish iteration of the ‘actio injuriarum’ at hand had nothing in 
common with the Roman conceptualisation and that the term stood as nothing more than ‘a convenient Latin term 
for expressing a class of actions known to our own law’ – p.847 
98 Indeed, it was bolstered by approval from a prominent successor to the office of Lord President, Viscount 
Dunedin: See Black v North British Railway Co. 1908 S.C. 444  
99 1972 SLT 110 
100 McKendrick v Sinclair 1972 SLT 110, p.120 
101 See Niall R. Whitty, Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body, [2005] Edin. L.R 194, p.200 
102 See Niall R. Whitty, Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body, [2005] Edin. L.R 194, p.204 
103 In the 2003 case of Martin v McGuiness 2003 SLT 1424, counsel for the pursuer made a ‘cautious’ submission 
that the case might have been one of iniuria, but in the words of Lord Bonomy ‘unfortunately [counsel] did not 
elaborate upon this, or attempt to establish by reference to authority the nature of and the basis for that remedy, 
nor indeed whether modern Scots law recognises it as a remedy’. (At para.27) 
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Trust104 – vindicated an argument set forth by Professor Whitty the previous year to the effect 
that the actio iniuriarum could be utilised to afford redress to family members affronted by the 
occurrence of an unauthorised post-mortem.105 In the words of Professor Whitty, ‘the actio 
iniuriarum is important not only for medical law but also further afield over much wider tracts 
of Scots private law, such as assault, constraint on physical liberty, personal molestation, 
harassment, defamation, confidentiality and privacy’.106 Much in the same way that ‘trespass’ 
might be said to be the ‘fertile mother of actions’107 and ‘trespass to the person’ might be 
described as a versatile umbrella-term covering many disparate causes of action, so too might 
iniuria be considered the progenitor and governess of many distinct forms of wrongdoing 
known to the law. 
C. Elements of Iniuria  
As alluded above, iniuria was an etymologically complex term. It carried different 
meanings depending on whether it was utilised within the context of the Aquilian damnum 
iniuria datum or in the sense of the specific delict iniuria. ‘Injury’ may now be understood as 
some hurt, wound or damage suffered by a person or animal; such, however, reflects the 
meaning of damnum within the context of the lex Aquilia, rather than iniuria, which, in this 
context, refers to wrongful conduct. The essence of the specific delict iniuria was not loss; 
indeed, pecuniary loss is immaterial in an actio iniuriarum.108 Mere upset or annoyance is 
sufficient to substantiate a claim for solatium under the action.109 In the words of Temporary 
Judge MacAulay QC, ‘in principle solatium for “hurt feelings” caused by affront based upon 
                                                          
104 2006 SLT 889 
105 See Niall R. Whitty, Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body, [2005] Edin. L.R 194 
106 Niall R. Whitty, Rights of Personality, Property Rights and the Human Body, [2005] Edin. L.R 194, p.197 
107 See F. W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law, (1909), Lecture IV 
108 David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.40 
109 See Cruickshanks v Forsyth (1747) Mor.4034 
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the actio injuriarium is a different animal to the solatium that can be awarded to a claimant for 
physical or psychiatric injury. Prima facie the threshold for recovery for hurt feelings is lower 
than that for psychiatric injury’.110 
The upset or annoyance of the pursuer must be demonstrated for there to be a successful 
actio iniuriarum – indeed, such is a fundamental prerequisite, for in the absence of genuinely 
wounded feelings, it is unlikely that an individual would subject themselves to the financial 
and time costs associated with litigation – but subjective affront alone is not sufficient to ensure 
a pursuer’s success in an actio iniuriarum. In order to establish iniuria, in the sense of the 
specific delict, the pursuer must show that the defender exhibited contumelia.111 Contumelia – 
variously described as ‘insult’,112 ‘contempt’,113 and ‘disrespect’,114 – can be demonstrated by 
establishing that the defender possessed sufficient animus iniuriandi in perpetrating the 
injurious conduct. Of the three proffered translations, the third is to be preferred, since the 
temptation to draw too close a parallel between iniuria and comparable Common law concepts 
should be resisted.  
Though, as noted above, contumelia may be understood as ‘insult’,115 Ibbetson has 
suggested that the better translation would be ‘hubris’ (and through this, disrespect), since the 
Romans evidently understood the delict in terms of this Greek idea.116 ‘It was in the very nature 
of contumelia [therefore] that the wrongdoer was deliberately acting without taking into 
                                                          
110 Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust 2006 SLT 889, p.902 
111 Jonathan Brown, Revenge Porn and the Actio Iniuriarum: Using ‘Old Law’ to Solve ‘New Problems’, [2018] 
Leg. Stud. 396, p.410 
112 J. Paul Sampley and Peter Lampe, Paul and Rhetoric (New York: T&T Clark, 2010) 
113 Peter Birks, Harassment and Hubris: The Right to an Equality of Respect, [1997] Irish Jurist 1  
114 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English, in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013)  
115 See the discussion in David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, 
Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.43 
116 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.40 
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account the interests of the victim’.117 Thus, whichever of the three potential translations of 
contumelia is preferred, it is plain that no pursuer would have had a claim if their feelings are 
hurt by the simple negligence of the defender; the defender must have contumeliously acted in 
such a manner so as to effect disgrace. 
Animus iniuriandi is generally translated as intention to injure,118 but it is here 
submitted that reckless or grossly negligent conduct may also impute sufficient animus for an 
actio iniuriarum to succeed.119 In the case of Stevens,120 the actions of the physicians who 
carried out the unauthorised post-mortem cannot be said to have been underpinned by intention 
or active malice. Rather, if the actions of the physicians were wrongful (as they were deemed 
to be), such stemmed from the wanton disregard shown to the feelings of the family members 
in deliberately conducting the post-mortem, rather than any design to effect disgrace.121 Animus 
iniuriandi must, therefore, be understood as more than ‘intention’; such is clear by dint of the 
fact that the Romans themselves did not truly draw any distinguish between conduct which 
might be described as intentional or reckless.122 Given that contumelia is the salient feature of 
injurious conduct, it might be inferred that any requirement of animus iniuriandi refers not to 
the mind-state of the wrongdoer at the time of the wrongdoing, as the modern notion of mens 
                                                          
117 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.40 
118 See, e.g., Helen Scott, Contumelia and the South African Law of Defamation in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen 
Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.120; see also the case of Suid-
Afrikaanse Uitsaaikoporasie v O’Malley 1977 3 SA 394 (A), wherein the South African Appellate division, in the 
context of a defamation case, defined animus iniuriandi as ‘intention to defame and knowledge of wrongfulness’ 
(para.73) 
119 This submission is in line with T. B. Smith’s observation that, in Scots law animus iniuriandi may be 
demonstrated by showing either intent or ‘negligence so gross as to be the equivalent of intent’: T. B. Smith, 
Designation of Delictual Actions: Damn, Injuria, Damn, 1972 SLT 125, p.126 
120 2006 SLT 889 
121 As Whitty noted in 2005, the Final Report of the Review Group on the Retention of Organs at Post Mortem 
(the McLean Report) found, in 2003, that ‘many parents felt the need to continue to protect the child after death, 
and for them past post-mortem practice was seen as a betrayal of that protective role. They saw this as an insult 
in addition to their grief’ (at para.9). 
122 Kenneth McKenzie Norrie, The Actio Iniuriarum in Scots Law: Romantic Romanism, or Tool for Today? in 
Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013) 
p.54 
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rea requires in the context of criminal law, but rather the wrongdoer’s general capacity to 
understand the wrongfulness of their actions in general combined with a hubristic disregard, 
borne of intention, recklessness or wanton carelessness, of the status of the victim.   
The Roman jurists Paul and Ulpian appeared to disagree with one another as to the 
scope of iniuria.123 It is often said that, in addition to proving that the defender displayed 
contumelia, any pursuer in an actio iniuriarum must also demonstrate that the conduct of the 
defender was contra bonos mores. This requirement has its roots in D.47.10.33, in which Paul 
suggests that one who carries out an act ‘in the public interest according to sound morals, even 
though it is contumelious towards someone… is not liable to an actio iniuriarum’.124 There is 
nothing comparable to this suggestion that the defender’s conduct must be contra bonos mores 
and contumelious in the surviving works of Ulpian.125 Professor Ibbetson has, however, put 
forth a convincing argument to explain this ostensible incongruity. In his view, it is likely that, 
for Ulpian, ‘the impropriety of the defendant’s conduct was bundled up in his notion of 
contumelia… whereas for Paul the two requirements were independent of one another, 
contumelia focusing on the subjective aspect of the defendant’s conduct and adversus bonos 
mores focusing on its social interpretation’.126 In modern terms, Ulpian conceptualised 
contumelia broadly, as being both subjectively and objectively injurious – in essence, anything 
which could be described as contumelious was inherently adversus bonos mores. Paul, 
conversely, understood contumelia as the subjective impetus of the affront suffered only, with 
the objective element of the injurious conduct being determined by separate reference to the 
                                                          
123 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.43 
124 D.47.10.33; author’s translation. (D.47.10.33 reads ‘quod rei publicae venerandae causa secundum bonos 
mores fit, etiamsi ad contumeliam alicuius pertinet, quia tamen non ea mente magistratus facit, ut iniuriarum 
facit, sed ad vindicatam maiestatis publicae respiciat, actione iniuriarum non tenetur’.) 
125 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.43 
126 David Ibbetson, Iniuria, Roman and English in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common 
Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.43 
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public interest question of bonos mores. In practice, there is therefore little to distinguish the 
opinions of Paul and Ulpian; within the schema of both jurists, objective and subjective 
wrongdoing must each be demonstrated for iniuria to be successfully averred.127 
As such, contumelious conduct, for the purposes of the actio iniuriarum, can 
consequently be defined as conduct, perpetrated by one who is compos mentis, which is contra 
bonos mores and which ultimately brings about some form of harm. Quite what is meant by 
the phrase contra bonos mores in law merits deeper consideration, however. As Professor 
Strauss indicates,128 it is not to be understood as ‘the customs of society or a particular social 
group’, nor indeed ‘of all ethical rules prevailing in society’.129 Boni mores is an essentially 
legal criterion;130 indeed, it is an essential element of the common law in Romanistic legal 
systems.131 Strauss defines boni mores, therefore, as ‘the juristic notions (‘regsopvattinge’) of 
society’ and notes that the term is both ‘admittedly vague’ and ‘not expressed in exact rules’.132 
For this reason, the standard of boni mores can be compared with the more modern, yet equally 
vague, notions of ‘public policy’ or the ‘public interest’.133 Expressed in modern terms, 
therefore, the essence of iniuria can be said to be the occurrence of some wrongful act which 
causes harm to the victim. In order to be actionable, this wrongful act must be manifestly 
contrary to public policy or decency and must subjectively hurt the victim.  
                                                          
127 Such appears to be the case in modern South African law also, wherein any claimant in an actio iniuriarum 
must establish that they were subjectively affronted by the objectively wrongful conduct of the defendant: See 
Delange v Costa 1989 (2) SA 857 (A), p.862F; Le Roux v Dey [2011] 3 SA 274 (CC), para.70. See also Helen 
Scott, Contumelia and the South African Law of Defamation in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and 
the Common Law, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), pp.129-133 
128 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.183 
129 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.183 
130 See W. A. Joubert, Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (Balkema, 1953), pp.109, 128; Hendrick J. O. van 
Heerden, Grondslae van die Mededingingsreg, (1963), p.99 
131 W. A. Joubert, Grondslae van die Persoonlikheidsreg (Balkema, 1953), p.146 
132 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.183 
133 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.182 
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The hurt effected by contumelious conduct may be psychological, physical, fiscal or 
simply emotional. It should be noted that any conduct which is intentionally designed to effect 
harm to the victim can be inferred to be both contumelious and contra bonos mores, but neither 
the mind-state of the perpetrator nor that of the victim is determinative in establishing that the 
conduct was contra bonos mores in all situations. It is clear that the law regards some hubristic 
shenanigans as so clearly contra bonos mores (or, so contrary to public policy) that the assent 
of the ‘victim’ cannot negate the occurrence of wrongdoing.134 Such, on the face of it, explains 
the operation of the medical exception within Scots law. Consent does not act as a ‘defence’ in 
an actio iniuriarum, rather it serves – if at all – as no more than a means of negating the 
existence of subjective affront only – that is to say, in the civil law, such may preclude an actio 
iniuriarum on the grounds of volenti non fit iniuria.135 It does not serve as a substantive 
justification for the wrongdoing. At most, it personally bars a potential pursuer from raising a 
delictual action.136 
In the criminal law, given that the complainer in any criminal trial is simply incidental 
to the process and not a party to any action, the lack of subjective affront may be deemed 
irrelevant if the injurious conduct is so manifestly contra bonos mores that prosecution is 
                                                          
134 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179; Smart v HM Advocate 
1975 J.C. 30 
135 Joe Thomson, Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007) para.11.09 
136 Volenti non fit iniuria – as a delictual defence – is distinct from the concept of ‘personal bar’ (see Elspeth Reid 
and John Blackie, Personal Bar, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2006), para.2-27) as volenti requires no more than an 
acceptance of risk on the part of the defender. Personal bar, by contrast, ‘requires some element of interaction or 
communication between the parties’; ‘the obligant must have been aware of the conduct on which the bar is said 
to be based’. Thus, in Le Roux and Ors v Dey 2010 (4) SA 210 (SCA), for instance, the school principal, in 
intimating that he was ‘prepared to dismiss the episode’, would be deemed to have suffered no actionable 
subjective affront and be personally barred from pursuing a claim. Conversely (and hypothetically) had he and Dr 
Dey consented, in advance (for whatever reason), to the schoolboy prank, they would have been volens and so 
deemed to have suffered no subjective affront. In any case, the actions of the boys remained (in some measure) 
objectively wrongful – though they were not sufficiently contra bonos mores to merit criminal prosecution, as 
some forms of iniuria might be even in the presence of consent. See Helen Scott, Contumelia and the South 
African Law of Defamation in Eric Descheemaeker and Helen Scott, Iniuria and the Common Law, (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart, 2013), p.119 
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thought to be in the ‘public interest’.137 Society, not the individual, is said to feel the requisite 
affront when a manifestly wrongful act occurs.138 Accordingly, it can be determined that an 
assault which is not intended to inflict any affront may nevertheless be regarded as criminal, if 
society as a whole has an interest in proscribing such assaults.139 The essence of the 
wrongdoing present in assault is not the unwarranted physical contact – or attempt to effect 
such – but rather the hubris of the assailant. 
III. Consent and Injury 
A. Delictual Assault 
 ‘Consent’ is generally presupposed to be a defence to any action of delictual assault.140 
It is thought trite law that ‘the term assault of itself involves the notion of want of consent. An 
assault with consent is not an assault at all’.141 As is pointed out in the leading textbook on 
Delict, however, ‘although it probably makes very little difference in practice it should be noted 
that, in principle, consent is not a defence [to assault]. Rather, an absence of consent forms a 
                                                          
137 In this sense, then, it may be thought that the procedural decision to charge and prosecute the accused ‘in the 
public interest’ constitutes an element of the offence itself, however, for such a prosecution to be successful, the 
court will, of course, have to agree with the judgement of the prosecutor in determining that the conduct of the 
accused in any instant case is sufficiently contra bonos mores. Such is demonstrated by the English case of R v 
Wilson [1997] Q.B. 47: Therein, the prosecution believed that it was in the public interest to prosecute a man who 
had ‘branded’ his wife in the course of a sex act, but the court ultimately held that it was ‘firmly of the opinion 
that it is not in the public interest that activities such as the appellant's in this appeal should amount to criminal 
behaviour’ (at p.50). Indeed, the court went so far as to express that they found nothing immoral in Wilson’s 
conduct, stating that ‘had it been necessary for us to consider sentence we would have granted the appellant an 
absolute discharge’ (at p.51). 
138 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.182 
139 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30 
140 This is true in both the Common law (see John A. Devereux, Consent as a Defence to Assaults Occasioning 
Bodily Harm - The Queensland Dilemma [1987] U. Queensland L. J.. 151) and in Scots law: See Craig v Glasgow 
Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals Board of Management (23 March 1976, unreported); Thomson v Devon (1899) 
15 Sh Ct Rep 209 
141 See Schloss v. Maguire (1897) Q.C.R. 337, p.339. Within the Scottish context, this is echoed in the unreported 
decision of Craig v Glasgow Victoria and Leverndale Hospitals Board of Management (23 March 1976, 
unreported), of which Professor Blackie remarked that ‘the opinions of the court… proceed on an assumption that 
assault is what is at issue and the extent of the consent given by the pursuer is what has to be determined’: John 
W. G. Blackie, Scotland, in E. Deutsch and H. L. Schreiber, Medical Responsibility in Western Europe: Research 
Study of the European Science Foundation, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1985), p.579 
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part of the definition of the claim or offence’.142 Such belies the delictual action’s connection 
to the actio iniuriarum; as indicated above, if the ‘victim’ consents to occurrence of the 
contumelious conduct, they are volens and cannot claim to have been affronted by the 
defender’s conduct. Alternatively, they may be deemed to be personally barred from claiming 
foul play. 
The express importance of ‘affront’ in cases of assault was manifest in the nineteenth 
century authorities; however, it gradually receded in the course of the 20th century.143 With that 
said, since the essence of the delictual action for assault remains ‘affront’, even if this remains 
only as an unarticulated undercurrent of the law,144 it is submitted that the modern nominate 
Scottish delict of ‘assault’ continues to stand as a tertiary sub-category of the wider concept of 
iniuria,145 even if Aquilian loss may also now be claimed in respect of such bodily injury.146  
Thus, it follows that the modern delict can – and ought to be – analysed with reference to the 
historical understanding of iniuria.  
                                                          
142 Joe Thomson, Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007) para.11.09. The absence of consent may be presumed in 
the absence of evidence from the defender that there was some reasonable belief that the pursuer had consented – 
such is consistent with the presumption of animus iniuriandi in respect of defamation actions: See Kenneth McK 
Norrie and Jonathan Burchell, Impairment of Reputation, Dignity and Privacy, in Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Kenneth Reid, and Daniel Visser, Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in 
Scotland and South Africa, (Oxford: OUP, 2005), p.551. Such circumvents the criticisms of the decision in 
Freeman v Home Office (No 2) [1984] QB 524 and – as defamation is itself a species of iniuria, remains consistent 
with the roots of ‘assault’ as an actio iniuriarum. See also Niall Whitty and Murray Earle, Medical Law, (Reissue) 
in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, para.242, wherein it is noted that ‘the onus of proof is 
on the defender to establish that the pursuer consented’. 
143 See Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.01 
144 See the discussion in Rutherford v Chief Constable for Strathclyde Police 1981 SLT (Notes) 119, wherein the 
potential for additional solatium in respect of an otherwise Aquilian claim for damages arising from an assault 
was recognised. See also T. B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1962), 
p.650 
145 As it did on its emergence as a nominate delict in the 19th century: See John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in 
Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, 
(Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.103 
146 Brian Pillans, Delict: Law and Policy, (5th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2014), para.6-13 
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Indeed, the leading text on Delict describes the modern action for delictual assault as 
an actio iniuriarum.147 This is so on the basis that ‘the actio injuriarum root of Scots law infuses 
the delict [assault] as much as any development of the lex Aquilia’148 and, properly so termed, 
assault remains a form of ‘real injury’ in both civil149 and criminal law.150 In Walker’s Law of 
Delict, assault is described as ‘a real injury, tending to the disgrace of the person assaulted, and 
the worst kind of injuria, closely akin to defamation’.151 The salient element of any delictual 
assault is not, therefore, physical touching or wounding, or any attempt to effect such, but rather 
the insult that accompanies any intentional or reckless (i.e., hubristic) invasion of the victim’s 
bodily integrity.152  
Assault has been described as an intentional delict,153 but only insofar as the fact that 
the negligence of a defender will not give rise to a claim of assault.154 In Reid v Mitchell,155 
wherein it was recognised that the defender ‘probably had not the slightest intention of injuring 
anyone’,156 Lord Young expressed the view that ‘if a man playfully attacks another to make 
him engage in sport, I am of the opinion that that is an assault’;157 this opinion was further 
vindicated by the court in Wilson v Exel UK Ltd.,158 wherein a form of ‘horseplay’ was 
                                                          
147 Joe Thomson (Ed.), Delict, (Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons, 2007), para.11.07 
148 Brian Pillans, Delict: Law and Policy, (5th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2014), para.6-13 
149 David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.488 
150 See Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.01. Scottish criminal law remains largely uncodified and most serious crimes (with the exception 
of rape, since the passing of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009) remain governed by the common law.  
151 David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1966), p.494; David M. 
Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.488 
152 See David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.488, fn.15 
153 Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.10 
154 Tellingly, ‘assault’ is not afforded treatment by Norrie in his elucidation of the intentional delicts known to 
Scots law: See Kenneth McK. Norrie, The Intentional Delicts in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann, A 
History of Private Law in Scotland, (Oxford: OUP, 2000), pp.477-516 
155 (1885) 12 R. 1129 
156 Per Lord Justice Clerk Moncrieff; Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R. 1129, p.1131 
157 Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R. 1129, p.1132 
158 2010 SLT 671 
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nevertheless deemed actionable as assault.159 These cases, concerned, as they are, with ‘injury’ 
in the modern sense of that term (and termed ‘actual’ assaults by Walker),160 do not have their 
root in the Romanistic actio iniuriarum, but are rather cases of Aquilian liability.161 The 
‘injuries’ suffered by the pursuers in these cases are forms of damnum, thus any injuria within 
the context of these discussions must be understood as Aquilian in substance and in root. 
Damages are the appropriate form or reparation in cases of this kind; as these cases are not 
concerned with contumelious wrongdoing – and so not with ‘assault’ in its sense as a species 
of ‘real injury’ – solatium is not appropriate remedy.162 
The category of ‘indirect assault’ described by  Professor Walker – and, indeed, some 
elements of what he termed ‘notional assaults’163 – more clearly indicate the connection 
between the modern delict of assault and the historical crime/delict of injury.164 As restated and 
emphasised by Professor Reid, ‘it is doubtless equally an assault deliberately to do any act… 
which results in the person’s being affronted or put in a state of alarm, or physically hurt’.165 
Though Reid records the fact that authorities for assault based on affront are slender in 
Scotland,166 she likewise notes that some cases such as Henderson v Chief Constable of Fife,167 
wherein a prisoner was subjected to an invasive strip-search, would have been ‘more logically 
categorised as infringing privacy alone’ and so actionable on grounds of an iniuria-based claim 
                                                          
159 Wilson v Exel UK Ltd 2010 SLT 671, para.10 
160 David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.491 
161 The same is true of the recent case of Somerville v Harsco Infrastructure Ltd [2015] SCEDIN 71 
162 The pursuer in Reid v Mitchell (1885) 12 R. 1129 sought damages and solatium, but was awarded only damages, 
with the interlocutor pronounced making no mention of solatium: (1885) 12 R. 1129, p.1132 
163 See Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.18 
164 See David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.492 
165 See Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.19, citing David M. Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, (2nd Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1981), p.492 
(Reid’s emphasis). 
166 Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.19 
167 1988 SLT 361 
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of assault,168 rather than on the authority of the English case of Lindley v Rutter169 on which 
the decision in Henderson ultimately turned.170 
That the decision in Henderson was founded on English precedent rather than the 
principles of Scots law can be explained by the fact that Scotland’s judiciary was not liable to 
recognise the importance of the Romanistic actio iniuriarum in the 20th century. Indeed, it has 
been suggested that ‘it is questionable whether [the actio iniuriarum] offers a sustainable model 
for the development of personality right protection’.171 Since the advent of the 21st century, 
however, there has been some indication that this the judiciary is more willing to entertain 
arguments predicated on the occurrence of iniuria.172 It has been suggested that this willingness 
to entertain arguments pertinent to ‘dignity’ has arisen as a result of the ‘bringing home’ of 
human rights which occurred by the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998.173  In light of 
this renewed willingness to consider the actio iniuriarum as a mechanism to afford redress to 
Scottish litigants,174 it is submitted that were a case akin to Henderson to once again call before 
the Scottish courts, the judiciary might be more likely to entertain a claim founded on historical 
Scottish principles rather than comparatively recent English precedent.  
Such, of course, is mere speculation. With that said, whether or not the actio iniuriarum 
roots of the modern delict of assault attain juridical recognition is largely immaterial; the salient 
elements of delictual assault remain practically tied to the essential elements of ‘real injury’ as 
                                                          
168 Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.20; para.17.08 
169 [1981] QB 128 
170 Henderson v Chief Constable of Fife 1988 SLT 361, p.637 
171 See Elspeth C. Reid, Protection of Personality Rights in the Modern Scots Law of Delict, in Niall R. Whitty 
and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 
2009), p.305 
172 See, e.g., the discussion in Martin v McGuinness 2003 SLT 1424 
173 Brian Pillans, Delict: Law and Policy, (5th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2014), para.7-01; Kenneth McK. Norrie, 
The Scots Law of Defamation: Is There a Need for Reform? in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmerman, Rights 
of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), pp.433-451 
174 See, also, the discussion in Jonathan Brown, Revenge Porn and the Actio Iniuriarum: Using ‘Old Law’ to Solve 
‘New Problems’, [2018] Leg. Stud. 396 
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that term was understood by the Institutional writers, whether or not such is juridically 
articulated. Thus, a delictual assault in Scotland is constituted by the occurrence of some 
contumelious action designed – or manifestly likely to – harm the corpus of the victim. Indeed, 
per Lord Reed’s opinion in Rorrison v West Lothian College,175 it seems that the door remains 
open for modern Scots law to recognise the actionability for an assault on a person’s dignitas, 
or wider existimatio, as well as their corpus.176  
The action constitutive of assault must be subjectively and objectively wrongful to be 
legally actionable; that is, the victim must feel that they have been assaulted by the defender’s 
conduct and the defender’s conduct must be demonstrably contra bonos mores. In delict, the 
former is demonstrated by the simple fact of the pursuer having raised the claim; the latter is, 
practically, the only point at issue in proof. Should it be deemed that the defender’s conduct is 
not  contra bonos mores, the pursuer will have no claim, however terribly that they themselves 
feel they have been assaulted. The standard of boni mores, as a functional analogue to the 
modern concept of ‘public policy’ is variable and capable of rapid change and adaptation. 
Conduct which might have been considered to contravene public policy a mere decade ago 
may no longer be seen to do so;177 likewise, an action previous perceived as ‘innocent’ may 
now be regarded as an egregious wrong.178 This statement is as true in respect of criminal 
assault as it is in respect of delictual assault. 
                                                          
175 2000 SCLR 245, at p.250 
176 See the discussion in Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2010), para.2.23. Lord Reed’s comments may be read narrowly, as they relate only to the specific pleadings 
and make no comment on the possibility of a positive action for redress in the event of intentionally caused 
psychiatric injury, however in light of Macaulay QC’s observation that ‘in principle solatium for "hurt feelings" 
caused by affront based upon the actio injuriarium is a different animal to the solatium that can be awarded to a 
claimant for physical or psychiatric injury. Prima facie the threshold for recovery for hurt feelings is lower than 
that for psychiatric injury’, it is submitted that a wider reading is to be preferred: See Stevens v Yorkhill NHS Trust 
2006 SLT 889, para.63 
177 See the discussion infra. 
178 Consider, for example, the hypothetical ‘outing’ of a homosexual in public life. Throughout the 20 th century, 
it was regarded as a matter of public interest that the identities of ‘closeted’ individuals should be made known in 
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B. Criminal Assault 
The actio iniuriarum roots of the civil action for assault are now obscured in Scots law, 
but the connection between the criminal conception and the notion of iniuria is even less clear. 
Rather than ‘affront’, the salient element of a criminal assault is now generally understood to 
be an ‘attack’, whether that attack proves effective (i.e., whether it succeeds in harming the 
victim) or not.179 Nevertheless, as the law pertinent to assault has never been codified in 
Scotland, it is not inaccurate to continue to describe the crime as a species of ‘real injury’,180 
albeit it one which maintains a place of prominence in that taxonomical family.181 Indeed, 
criminal assault is expressly recognised as a form of real injury by the leading textbook on 
Scottish criminal law,182 although it is a form which is said to be distinguishable from other 
forms of real injury by the requirement of an ‘attack’ (broadly defined).183 It has, thus, long 
been unnecessary to aver that the occurrence of an assault was wrongful, as such is inherent in 
the very notion.184 
As noted above, the term ‘assault’ was not known to the early Scottish Institutional 
writers. Until the end of the 17th century, the word possessed only the non-technical meaning 
of an organised attack on a building.185 Jurists including MacKenzie, Bayne and Forbes do 
                                                          
the media. By the turn of the century, however, public opinion had manifestly turned against the press as tabloid 
readers had come to ‘find unwarranted intrusion offensive’: See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/212737.stm   
179 See Lord Advocate’s Reference (No.2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43 
180 A. M. Anderson, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Sweet & Maxwell, 1892), p.81 
181 Indeed, the index of Alison’s Practice redirects the reader to the heading of ‘assault’ under the entry for ‘real 
injury’ – see Archibald J. Alison, Practice of the Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol. II, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 
1833), p.715 
182 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.01; see also the discussion in Timothy H. Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law, (6th Ed.) 
(Edinburgh: W. Green, 2015) para.9-04 
183 See Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.01 
184 See Wilson v Bennett (1904) 6 F 269 
185 John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.53 
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employ the term when discussing the criminal law of ‘injury’, but only in the context of the 
crime/delict ‘hamesucken’186 which, as discussed above, existed as a sub-category of ‘real 
injury’. ‘Of all real injuries’, according to Bayne, this nominate wrong ‘is punished with the 
greatest severity’ as the delict is ‘atrocious’ by dint of its being committed by ‘assaulting a man 
in his own house’.187  Since the attack on the pursuer in his home (that is, in a building of some 
kind) is central to this species of injury, the jurists’ use of the term ‘assault’ is potentially 
ambiguous.188 As the Edinburgh Justiciary court had begun to employ the term ‘assault’ as a 
synonym for an ‘invasion of the person’189 from as early as 1667,190 it may reasonably be 
concluded that by the beginning of the 18th century the word carried with it some connotation 
of an ‘attack’ on a person, in its modern sense. 
In any case, it is clear that though the term might have been used by lawyers and jurists 
throughout the 18th century,191 it appeared only as a descriptive and non-technical term.192 
‘Assault’ was not a crime/delict in its own right and it did not come to be regarded as such until 
the turn of the 19th century.193 ‘Notwithstanding the development of “assault” as an apparent 
nominate delict [and crime], certain aspects continued to reveal the ius commune heritage [of 
the wrong].194 Although limited to occasions in which there has been an ‘attack’, ‘the crime of 
                                                          
186 Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.182; William 
Forbes, The Institutes of the Law of Scotland, Vol. II (Edinburgh: John Mosman and Co, 1730), p.130 
187 Alexander Bayne, Institutions of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Ruddimans, 1730), p.182 
188 See the discussion in John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights 
of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.53 
189 See the discussion in John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights 
of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.53 
190 Thus pre-dating the publication of the first edition of MacKenzie’s Matters Criminal by some three years.  
191 See, e.g., Murphey (1732) reported in J. Imrie, The Justiciary Records of Argyll and the Isles (1705-1742) 
(Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1969), p.236; Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland 
in Civil Rights: With Observations on the Agreement or Diversity between them and the Laws of England, in four 
books, after the General Method of the Viscount of Stair’s Institutions, (Edinburgh: R. Fleming, 1751), Book I, 
Tit. X, 29 
192 John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), p.104 
193 Hume, Commentaries, vol. I, p.327 
194 John Blackie, Unity in Diversity, in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots 
Law: A Comparative Perspective, (Dundee: DUP, 2009), pp.108-109 
29 
 
 
assault at common law covers a very wide spectrum of harmful or alarm-producing 
behaviour’.195 MacDonald emphasises that the ‘assault’ need not wound the victim at all.196 
The requisite level of ‘intention’ necessary for a criminal assault is, however, higher than the 
standard for delictual assault. While the latter must be read broadly, as any deliberate conduct 
leading to harm (physical, psychological or to feelings),197 in criminal law the mens rea of 
assault is ‘evil intention’,198 generally understood as an intention to effect bodily injury (in its 
modern sense) for no legitimate purpose.199 This means that, for there to be a criminal ‘assault’ 
in law, the accused must have ‘attacked’ the victim while demonstrating a manifest intention 
to do them unwarranted bodily harm.200 
Unlike in civil law, ‘consent’ is not generally conceived of as a defence to criminal 
assault,201 unless there is demonstrably no intention to cause physical wounds (or ‘injury’, in 
its modern sense of ‘wounds’).202 Prior to the latter half of the 20th century, the claim that 
consent was an absolute defence was arguable;203 the first edition of Gordon’s Criminal Law 
noted that at the time of its publication there had been ‘hardly any consideration given in 
Scotland to the position of consent as a defence to a charge of assault’204 and, although English 
legal scholars had, at this time, critically engaged with the question, it is notable that they had 
                                                          
195 Timothy H. Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law, (7th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2018) para.9-04 
196 See John H. MacDonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, (5th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green 
1948), p.115 
197 Elspeth C. Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2010), 
para.2.10 
198 HM Advocate v Phipps (1905) 4 Adam 616, p.630 (per Lord Ardwall). 
199 See Timothy H. Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law, (7th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2018) para.9-16 
200 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.33; Lord Advocate’s Reference (No.2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43, p.53C-D 
McDonald v HM Advocate 2004 SCCR 161, para.23 
201 See Timothy H. Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law, (7th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2018) para.9-19 
202 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, Vol. II (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2017) para.33.38 
203 The 19th century case of Fraser (1847) Ark. 280 appeared, in fact, to suggest that consent did provide a defence 
to a criminal assault; see p.302, per Lord Mackenzie. 
204 Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1967), p.773 
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not achieved ‘any definite result’.205 Scots law was, however, clarified by the 1975 case of 
Smart v HM Advocate,206 wherein the court definitively held that consent was no defence to 
the crime of assault where both the mens rea and actus reus of the crime could be 
demonstrated.207 
The case of Smart concerned two individuals who elected to partake in a ‘square go’; 
common Scottish parlance for a ‘fair fight’ (or, at least, a fight with no recourse to weapons).208 
The panel (i.e., the accused and appellant) was apprehended and charged, on indictment, with 
assaulting the other party to the fight. It was argued, at first instance and on appeal, that the 
panel could not be guilty of the crime of assault as both he and the victim had consented to the 
risk of bodily harm. The court rejected this argument with reference to the opinion of Lord 
Justice-Clerk Cooper, who had held in the case of H.M Advocate v Rutherford that consent was 
no defence to a charge of murder.209 Per curiam, the court posed the question: ‘is there any 
justification for applying this line of authority to serious assaults but not to minor assaults?’,210 
before quickly answering that ‘in our opinion there is not’.211 
The connection between the court’s judgment and Strauss’ conception of boni mores,212 
as the standard to be applied in any case predicated on iniuria,213 may be noted in the final 
paragraph of the opinion in Smart:  ‘it is in the public interest that it should be decided and 
made known that consent to a “square go” is not a defence to a charge of assault based on that 
                                                          
205 Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1967), p.773 
206 1975 J.C. 30 
207 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.33 
208 The term has made its way into the Collins English dictionary: See 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/square-go 
209 See 1947 J.C. 1, p.6; the court in Smart also made reference to the unreported case of Purves (High Court, 
Edinburgh, February 1964), in which the court affirmed Lord Cooper’s opinion in respect of assault to the danger 
of life with a knife. 
210 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.33 
211 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.33 
212 See supra. 
213 S. A. Strauss, Bodily Injury and the Defence of Consent, [1964] S. African L. J. 179, p.183 
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agreed combat’.214 Thus, the continuing influence of the historic actio iniuriarum can be seen 
in respect of the modern crime of assault; as in the law of delict, the standard to be used in 
ultimately determining whether or not the wrong has occurred boils down to considerations of 
public policy.215 Consent is relevant only insofar as public policy recognises its potential to 
turn wrong into right; some actions might be considered contra bonos mores (and so ‘assault’) 
only in the absence of consent, while others will be considered contra bonos mores (and so 
‘assault’) even where consent is present. This, it is submitted, rationally justifies the existence 
of the ‘medical exception’ within Scots law. 
C. The Medical Exception 
As indicated above, on almost any occasion in which a patient truly and knowingly 
provides consent in advance of a medical procedure,216 they will be unable to raise a delictual 
claim of assault. This is not, however, the case because the operating physician can raise a 
‘defence’ of consent, rather it is the case because, in the presence of consent, the patient is 
barred from claiming that they were subjectively affronted by the physicians conduct. It should 
be noted, here, that the medical operation need not be ‘legitimate’ for this form of bar to the 
claim to arise. Indeed, the operation of this doctrine is not a proper example of the ‘medical 
exception’ at all; rather, the proscription of the delictual claim arises by operation of the 
familiar rule volenti non fit injuria. 
                                                          
214 Smart v HM Advocate 1975 J.C. 30, p.34 
215 Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) 1993 JC 43 does not mention ‘public policy’ directly and the reasons 
given as to why, for instance, the physical contact necessarily involved in the course of a game of rugby does not 
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216 Though, in 2014, it was justifiably said that the doctrine of ‘informed consent’ has not yet found its way into 
Scots law (See Brian Pillans, Delict: Law and Policy, (5th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2014), para.6-05), and 
indeed the American understanding of that term has not, it is generally been thought that a patient must be thought 
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treatment in law: See Sheila A. M. McLean, Autonomy, Consent and the Law, (London: Routledge, 2009)   
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The ‘medical exception’, properly so termed, as it can be said to operate in the civil 
law, applies only in cases in which the patient did not consent to what was otherwise a 
legitimate medical procedure.217 It is trite to say that the actions of the physician, in conducting 
such an operation, are deliberate; thus, in delict, the requirement for ‘intention’ on the part of 
the ‘wrongdoer’ is demonstrated in any case of surgery.218 The real question for the court, 
should a patient sue a physician, is whether or not the actions of the physician, in performing 
the operation, could be said to be contra bonos mores (i.e., the question is whether or not the 
occurrence of the operation itself was against public policy). If public policy was contravened 
by the physician’s actions, say by the physician subjecting an unconscious patient to an 
untested and novel means of treatment, the patient could legitimately raise an actio iniuriarum 
(likely in the form of a claim for assault), otherwise, since the physician’s actions were not 
contra bonos mores, there could be no delictual claim and thus the medical practitioner might 
be said to have been exempted from liability. 
Since modern mores (i.e., public policy) regard bodily invasions, in the absence of 
consent, as more universally repugnant than such would have been thought in bygone days,219 
there is limited scope for the application of the exception in the 21st century. The presence of 
the patient’s consent tends to be necessary in order to ensure that the operation is seen, in law, 
as ‘legitimate’.220 While, at one time, the judiciary might have been wary of interfering in 
                                                          
217 E.g., it might be said to apply in the case of an unconscious patient who, after suffering an accident, was rushed 
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prominence which negligence has obtained within both the Scots law of Delict and the Common law of tort. This 
practical consideration does not, however, detract from the theoretical discussion contained in this article.  
219 The principle of ‘autonomy’ has now superseded the previous paternalistic approach to medicine; thus, as 
patients are generally perceived to possess a robust ‘right to autonomy’, the General Medical Council recognises 
that in straightforward cases, individuals have the right to determine their own ‘best interests’ and so they should 
not be subjected to any medical treatment without their express consent: See GMC, Confidentiality: Draft 
Guidance for Consultation, (2009) 
220 See Margaret Brazier and Sara Fovargue, Transforming Wrong into Right: What is ‘Proper Medical 
Treatment’?, in Sara Fovargue and Alexandra Mullock, The Legitimacy of Medical Treatment: What Role for the 
Medical Exception, (London: Routledge, 2016), pp.13-14 
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decisions made by doctors,221 as patients are now conceptualised as persons – indeed, as 
consumers – holding rights and exercising choice,222 it follows that to rob such persons of 
choice is regarded as a more egregious wrong – and consequently more contrary to public 
policy223 – than to take an action which, while in their best interests, they have not consented 
to.224 Thus, there is more scope for individuals to pursue a claim of delictual assault, or indeed 
negligence, in respect of operations which occurred without their express consent.  
The absence of an ‘attack’ in medical operations may be said to preclude a charge of 
criminal assault,225 as can the absence of the mens rea of ‘evil intent’, but this does not 
adequately explain why a surgeon or physician may not be convicted if charged with effecting 
some other form of real injury. As noted in Gordon, ‘all intentional infliction of physical injury 
is criminal’.226 The crime of ‘real injury’, of which assault is a species, is, like its Romanistic 
legal ancestor iniuria realis, both flexible and broad227 and has been held to cover matters as 
varied as supplying ‘glue-sniffing kits’ to children228 as well as torture229 and other forms of 
                                                          
221 See the comments of Lord Bingham (then Master of the Rolls) in Frenchay NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All E.R. 
403, p.411; see also the discussion in Margaret Brazier and José Miola, Bye-Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation 
Revolution? [2000] Med. L. R. 85, p.93  
222 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board Scotland 2015 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 63, para.75; this case, though Scottish 
in origin, has exercised a notable influence on the English law pertinent to medical treatment and assault: See 
Emma Cave, The Ill-Informed: Consent to Medical Treatment and the Therapeutic Exception [2017] Common 
Law World Review 140. On the present analysis, the case may be read as redefining (in part) what constitutes 
boni mores. 
223 See also Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 A.C. 134, para.56 where it was said that ‘the function of the law is to protect 
the patient's right to choose’ (per Lord Hope of Craighead) 
224 Indeed, it has always been open for a mentally competent adult to refuse medical treatment: See Re T (Adult) 
[1992] 4 All ER 649 ; consider, also Williamson v East London and City Health Authority [1998] 41 BMLR 85 
225 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.39  
226 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.46 
227 Per Hume, ‘if it amount to a real injury, it shall be sustained to infer punishment… no matter how new or how 
strange the wrong’: Hume, i, pp.327–328 
228 See Khaliq v HM Advocate 1984 J.C. 23 
229 Known in such circumstances as ‘stellionate’: John H. A. MacDonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal 
Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: William Paterson, 1867), p.186; Archibald J. Alison, Principles of the Criminal 
Law of Scotland, Vol. I, (Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1832), p.196, though ‘this term is no longer in use’: See 
Principal Reporter v N 2014 G.W.D. 30-592, para.189 
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direct physical wounding.230 In seeking to justify why ‘in the case of surgical operations 
consent is a defence [to assault and other forms of real injury] even where the injuries are likely 
to cause danger to life’, Gordon and his later editors were unable to state with certainty the 
legal reason that such actions gave rise to no criminal liability, relying instead on a probability 
assessment.231 The standard of probabilities has no place in criminal law, whether in proof or 
in the designation of crimes, however, and a more intellectually satisfactory rationale for the 
preclusion of criminal liability is required, particularly as it may be difficult to argue that all 
medical procedures are carried out for the benefit of the patient. 
As in delict, because roots of ‘assault’ and ‘real injury’ in criminal law lie in the actio 
iniuriarum, the existence of the ‘medical exception’ can be justified on grounds of public 
policy. The law does not regard a competent physician appropriately discharging their duty to 
be acting contra bonos mores and so it follows that no physician who conducts a legitimate 
medical operation can be liable for assault or effecting real injury. Indeed, in classical 
terminology, since the physicians’ actions cannot be said to be contra bonos mores, no ‘injury’ 
is inflicted to the patient at all. Thus, it has been demonstrated that the ‘medical exception’ 
need not be justified by axioms or by reference to assessment of probabilities, but rather that 
there remain good taxonomical reasons in Scots law precluding criminal liability in cases of 
legitimate medical treatment. Expressed in such terms, it seems that the medical exception is 
not, in fact, an ‘exception’ at all. There is no general rule that to cause bodily wounds, in the 
absence of affront, is a civil wrong or a crime; rather, it appears that the ‘exception’ arises as a 
consequence of the ordinary rules of law underpinning the Scottish conceptions of ‘assault’ 
and ‘real injury’, rather than a sui generis deviation from those usual rules. Such does not rely 
on any differentiation between major and minor injuries, nor does it rely on the consent of the 
                                                          
230 A. M. Anderson, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Edinburgh: Sweet & Maxwell, 1892), p.81 
231 Fiona Leverick and James Chalmers, Gordon’s Criminal Law of Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 
2017) para.33.39 - see fn.10 supra.  
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patient;232 such also appropriately – if not satisfactorily233 – affords guidance in respect of what 
Lewis termed ‘new and controversial medical procedures’.234 
As Lewis notes, ‘formal legal change – judicial decisions or legislation – on new and 
controversial medical procedures is rare in Common law jurisdictions’.235 So, too, has this been 
rare in the mixed jurisdictions of Scotland and South Africa. Often, in such jurisdictions, new 
procedures come to be regarded as legitimate implicitly, by way of the provision of state funds 
for some or all patients,236 but this is not necessarily sufficient.237 It is, however, clear that the 
change often arises ‘informally’. Consequently, it appears that the impetus for informal change, 
as understood by Lewis, is driven by changing mores. The allocation of state funding for the 
purposes of providing new or controversial medical procedures is but one way in which 
changing mores might implicitly be recognised within a state; consideration of empirical 
research,238 a judicial sense of public opinion239 and, indeed, the judges’ own experience and 
interpretation of the conduct in question might also lead to the legitimation of controversial 
forms of treatment.240  
                                                          
232 Neither of which, per Smart, are relevant to a charge of criminal assault in Scots law: See Smart v HM Advocate 
1975 J.C. 30, pp.33-34 
233 The vagueness of the discussed conception of boni mores or ‘public policy’ is accepted to be problematic, as 
vagueness does not lend itself to good guidance. It is, however, submitted that vague guidance is better than no, 
or erroneous, guidance.  
234 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, p.355 
235 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, p.365 
236 Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, p.365 
237 Consider, for instance, the fact that abortion, in Scotland, was (indeed, remains) a common law crime, yet in 
1963 (and prior to the introduction of the Abortion Act 1967) 2% of women received state-funded abortions: See 
Jonathan Brown, Scotland and the Abortion Act 1967 – Historic Flaws, Contemporary Problems, [2015] Jur. Rev. 
135, p.136 
238 Although it has been noted that ‘judges in Ireland and Britain are less open to considering relevant empirical 
research than their peers elsewhere’: See Mark Coen and Imogen Jones, Evidence, Advocacy and the Social 
Sciences, [2018] International Journal of Evidence & Proof 189, p.189 
239 See the discussion in Malcolm Langford and Daniel Behn, Managing Backlash: The Evolving Investment 
Treaty Arbitrator?, [2018] European Journal of International Law 551, pp.561-562 
240 See Montgomery v HM Advocate 2003 1 AC 641, p.674 (per Lord Hope) 
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As the determination of mores rests entirely in the hands of the judiciary, the 
determination that the medical exception is most rationally conceptualised as an exercise of 
judicial discretion in applying public policy may be considered problematic by those who agree 
with the widespread criticism of the place of public policy in courtroom practice. The present 
piece, however, has sought only to present an analysis of how the medical exception operates 
at present in Scots law; any comment on the appropriateness, or otherwise, of this 
understanding is beyond the scope of this article.  
Within the context of the ‘exception’, therefore, consent is no more than one of but 
many doctrinal working tools which can be employed to turn ‘wrong’ into ‘right’, as a matter 
of public policy. Indeed, as (extra-juridically) expressed by Lord Atkin241 and Glanville 
Williams,242 within the context of the medical exception ‘one asks whether the patient’s 
consent is consistent with public policy’.243 If public policy determines that the patient’s 
consent nullifies the occurrence of ‘injury’, then no crime nor civil wrong will have been 
committed. Conversely, if the operation is deemed to be beyond the bounds of acceptable 
medical practice as a matter of public policy, the physician will be liable in criminal for 
performing the operation even if consent has been obtained.244 
                                                          
241 Lord Justice Atkin, in response to a paper read by Lord Riddell, The Legal Responsibility of the Surgeon (1924-
1925) 19 Transactions of the Medico-Legal Society 83, Discussion pp.93-97 
242 Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, (London: Faber and Faber, 1958), p.102 
243 See Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, pp.357 
244 Consider, for example, the practice of female genital mutilation. Even in the absence of specific legislative 
prohibition (as has been effected throughout England and Wales by the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 c.31) 
it is likely that such a procedure would be deemed contra bonos mores (i.e., against public policy) even if 
performed by a licenced medical practitioner with the consent of their patient. 
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 Public policy may also, however, deem the consent of the patient irrelevant,245 or hold 
that it has not been (or cannot be),246 as a matter of law, properly given.247 In each of these 
circumstances, in spite of the absence of patient consent, the physician’s conduct may remain 
lawful.248 Thus, it follows that not only can the ‘medical exception’ not be justified by reference 
to ‘consent’ in the Common law, but that ‘consent’ cannot be regarded, as has hitherto been 
contended,249 to be a prerequisite for the operation of the exception. ‘Consent’ is only relevant 
to the medical exception insofar as it is deemed possible to render conduct contra bonos mores 
ultimately boni mores and there are other legal pathways which might be employed to achieve 
this objective.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, from the above discussion it is clear that the ‘medical exception’ cannot, in 
fact, be termed an ‘exception’ within the context of Scots law as it does not operate as an 
exception to any general rule, but rather exists as a consequence of the general rule that 
invasions of bodily integrity must be juridically deemed contra bonos mores in order to be 
actionable in civil or criminal law. As Scottish criminal law remains largely governed by 
common law rules, and so principles of ius commune jurisprudence, it appears that there is no 
general rule that the deliberately inflict wounds is to commit a crime or civil wrong. Rather, 
for such conduct to be criminal or delictual, it must be ‘injurious’ in the classical sense; that is, 
                                                          
245 See, e.g., Marshall v Curry [1933] 3 DLR 260, but contrast this with the decision in the later case of Williamson 
v East London and City Health Authority [1998] 41 BMLR 85. It is here submitted that the difference in the 
decisions made in these cases arose as a result of changing mores. 
246 As in the case of a non-Gillick competent child: See Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbeck Area Health Authority 
[1986] AC 112 
247 See the discussion in G. T. Laurie, S. H. E. Harmon and G. Porter, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical 
Ethics, (10th Ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2016), ch.4 
248 See, e.g., Re M B (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R 426 
249 See Penney Lewis, The Medical Exception, [2012] Current Legal Problems 355, pp.357-358 
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it must be deliberate conduct which is manifestly contra bonos mores (that is, contrary to public 
policy).   
This is the case as a result of Scotland’s institutional connection to the Romanistic actio 
iniuriarum. In Scottish civil law, the action for delictual assault remains an actio iniuriarum 
and in criminal law ‘assault’ is a species of ‘real injury’ and so retains a connection to the 
institutional, and therefore Roman, concept of iniuria. As a physician who carries out a 
‘legitimate’ medical procedure cannot be said to have engaged in injurious conduct, they 
cannot logically be prosecuted, or held liable in civil law, for performing that procedure. As 
such, without reference to axioms or probability assessments, nor to any suggestion that the 
medical exception might be sui generis, the existence of the ‘medical exception’ within Scots 
law is both rationalised and explained. 
The standard of boni mores is admittedly vague, but – as indicated by Strauss – it is no 
more or less vague than the generally accepted references to ‘public policy’. Indeed, Strauss 
notes that the standard of boni mores and considerations of public policy might be equated; 
conduct which is boni mores is consistent with public policy, conduct contra bonos mores 
contravenes it. It is consequently difficult to determine whether or not a new or controversial 
medical procedure might be legitimately carried out in law in the absence of judicial direction. 
Though this is problematic, it is ultimately no different from the position in respect of any legal 
problem which turns on juridical considerations of public policy, such as the extension of the 
principles of vicarious liability. Accordingly, despite some suggestions to the contrary, it must 
be concluded that ‘consent’ is not as central to the ‘medical exception’ as is typically thought; 
rather, ‘consent’ serves as but one of many ways in which conduct which would otherwise 
contravene public policy might be deemed not to do so. 
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